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Dynamics of control mechanisms in a cost plus percentage contract 
 
Wen-Haw Huang*, Samuel Yen-Lian Yin*, H. Ping Tserng* 
National Taiwan University* 
 
 
ABSTRACT: While the control mechanisms of incentive contracts have been widely studied, this study 
attempts to determine the optimal control over a cost-plus percentage contract of a construction project. 
Cost-plus percentage contract shifts some risk from the contractor to client, thus offering little incentive for 
the contractor to control costs. The owner requires additional management over the construction project to 
ensure that only necessary costs are spent. The data are collected through documentation and interviews with 
both the owner and contractor. Empirical results indicate that multiple control mechanisms are necessary to 
manage properly the total cost of the projects. The owner cannot rely entirely on the contractor to control 
costs in a cost-plus percentage contract.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Business relationships are seldom based entirely on 
trust. Even in trust-based collaborative settings (e.g., 
partnering arrangements) the client still uses control 
mechanisms to ensure that contractors behave 
trustworthily (Badenfelt, 2010). Client does not have 
access to the same information as the contractor. The 
information asymmetry creates the potential of 
mistrust (Muller and Turner, 2005). As control is 
pervasive in construction projects, managing projects 
through various planning and control tools is viewed 
as bureaucratization, which increases control over 
individuals, teams, and organizations through 
ideologies efficiency and performance (Tuuli, et al., 
2010). Previously developed control mechanisms for 
incentive contracts had limitations to fully apply to 
cost plus percentage contract. 
 
As is generally assumed, cost-plus 
percentage contracts shift a certain amount risk from 
a contractor to client, thus offers little incentive for a 
contractor to control costs. . A client thus requires 
additional management over a construction project to 
ensure that only necessary costs are spent. Turner 
and Simister (2001) suggest cost-plus percentage 
contracts are used where uncertainty of both product 
and process is high. A client or government adopts 
this contract when designs are not finalized. Both 
contracting parties cannot agree on a fixed price, and 
construction must start immediately, followed by 
implementation of cost-plus contracts. This type of 
contract is useful after natural disaster which 
government needs to start rebuild the disaster area 
immediately without complete designs. Government 
select just one contractor should use cost plus 
contracts (McAfee and McMillan, 1986). The cost 
plus contracts total costs may be under than 
incentive contracts (Hiller and Tollison, 1978). Thus, 
cost-plus percentage contracts are important contract 
type for government to use during emergency crisis. 
 
1.1 Objectives  
Despite the consider attention paid recently in 
empirical studies to control mechanisms in incentive 
contracts for construction projects, the role of control 
in cost-plus percentage contracts has seldom been 
addressed. This study elucidates the dynamics of 
control in a cost-plus percentage contract, by 
examining to what extent control mechanisms in a 
control portfolio are used and how such control is 
exercised. This objective is achieved based on a case 
study involving a housing construction project. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Control mechanisms 
Control systems have been conceptualized and 
categorized in various ways, with formal and 
informal control as the two main categories 
(Langfield-Smith and Smith, 2003). Formal control 
is designed explicitly to monitor the results, while 
informal control is designed implicitly. Formal 
control attempts to restrict behaviors or outcomes, 
while informal control mechanisms depicted as 
self-control (Tuuli et al., 2010). Evaluating behavior 
ensures the feasibility of the process, while 
evaluating outcomes rely only on assessing the 
performance of member accurately and reliably, such 
as in policies, procedures, or reports. Informal 
control is exercised when organizations fail to 
specify task-related behaviors and output. Instead, 
informal control focuses on developing shared 
values, beliefs, and goals among members (Das and 
Teng, 2001). 
 
Cost-plus contract 
As is well known, cost-plus contracts allow for 
implementation of a fast track construction cycle, 
because building specifications and drawings do not 
need to be completed before construction 
commences. However, a client is limited in that 
these contracts tend to increase construction costs, as 
they provide less motivation for the contractor to 
work efficiently and minimize costs than fixed-price 
contracts do (Rosenfeld and Geltner, 1991). The 
ability to allow for permit construction to begin 
earlier is often highly prioritized, owing to its ability 
to contribute to a shorter construction period. Clients 
can reduce the cost of interest if the construction is 
completed earlier. The building can start operating 
earlier, which is another benefit for clients. While the 
ability to complete a project in a timely manner is 
obviously a valuable economic benefit, the 
possibility of increase construction costs is often 
unaware if the construction project is delayed. 
Cost-plus contracts are often used when designs are 
finalized, both contracting parties cannot agree on a 
fixed-price, and construction must start immediately. 
Cost-plus contracts vary in form. This study focuses 
on the cost-plus percentage of costs. Cost-plus 
percentage contract is an agreement on a 
construction project in which the contractor is 
provided a specified percentage profit over and 
above the actual construction costs (Friedman, 2007). 
A contractor thus gains higher profits when the 
actual costs of construction are higher.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
While focusing on how control manifests itself from 
interpretive and explorative perspectives, this study 
adopts qualitative research design methods and a 
case study as an in-depth research procedure (Yin, 
2009). The case study is based on a completed 
housing construction project. The data are based on 
reconstructions of the process involved between 
client and contractor. 
 
3.1 Method 
The empirical data was collected through interviews, 
documentary analysis and observations. The primary 
data sources are interviews with clients and 
contractor key personnel. Although unstructured, all 
interviews were taped and lasted approximately two 
hours. Other data were collected through documents 
and non-participant observation of project meetings. 
Notably, only notes were taken with no tape 
recording during non-participant observation. The 
data was analyzed based on qualitative analysis 
methods.  
The construction project involved in this 
study was an apartment complex building in Taiwan. 
The total construction costs were approximately $US 
35 million dollars for 22,000 square meter floor area. 
The project is delivered under cost-plus percentage 
contract. The contractor organization obtains 12.5% 
of the construction costs as its compensation. As one 
of the largest construction firms in Taiwan, the 
contractor has abundant experiences with cost-plus 
percentage contracts. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Control mechanisms used by client and contractor in 
construction project are examined. Table 1 
summarizes those results. 
 
 
Table 1 Control mechanisms identified and their actions 
Control mode Expressed 
problem 
Actions Executor Control 
Mechanism 
used 
Open book accounting system Minimize the 
risk of double 
charge on 
invoice 
Investigate 
invoices 
Client Formal 
Budget control Control 
construction 
cost 
Setup a ceiling 
for total cost 
Client Formal 
Allowed expense verification Minimize the 
risk of over 
charge 
Evaluation of 
invoices 
Client Formal 
Monitor material specification Minimize the 
risk of over 
design 
Evaluation of 
procurement 
process 
Client Formal 
Milestone report Minimize the 
risk of over 
budget 
Verifying work 
progress and any 
cost deviations 
Client Formal 
Web camera Monitor the 
work process 
Verifying work 
progress 
Client, 
contractor 
Informal 
Daily report Monitor 
contractor 
work 
underway 
Verifying work 
progress 
Client Informal 
Selection of subcontractors Minimize the 
risk of over 
Client and 
contractor select 
Client, 
contractor 
Informal 
budget subcontractors 
together 
Trust Nurture good 
relationships 
Sharing 
information 
Client, 
contractor 
Informal 
 
Formal control mechanisms 
Fixed-price contracts are the most commonly used 
contracts in construction project. Despite placing 
minimum administrative burden on the contracting 
parties, a fixed price contract subjects the contractor 
to the maximum risk arising from full responsibility 
for all cost escalations. As is well known, cost-plus 
percentage contract shifts a certain amount of risk 
from the contractor to the client, and offers little 
incentive for the contractor to control costs. 
Therefore, the client requires additional management 
over the construction project to ensure that only 
necessary costs are spent.  
 
Open book accounting 
The contractor had used SAP program as business 
management software. Implemented for many years, 
the system provides accounting information to the 
contractor and the client. The client could use this 
system to verify the quantity and amount of an 
invoice. The system also allows for monitoring of 
the performance. Both the client and contractor can 
monitor invoices to determine whether the 
construction project costs will exceed the allocated 
budget.  
 
Budget control 
In a cost-plus contract, a client pays all of the 
construction costs and takes all of the risk if the 
project exceeds the allocated budget. The client 
assumes that although it is a cost-plus contract, an 
upper limit should be set where the total construction 
costs can’t exceed this amount. This action gives the 
contractor an incentive to help the client to control 
budgetary costs.  
 
Allowed expenses 
A client pays a contractor both the actual cost of a 
construction project and a certain percentage of 
construction cost as compensation for profit. A client 
must thus verify what construction costs entail. For 
instance, although steel or concrete used on-site is 
considered an allowed expense, poor construction 
resulting in overwork or redundant work cannot be 
considered as construction expense. 
 
Monitoring of material specifications 
The client also had a control group to monitor the 
material quality. This process is to intended to 
prevent the contractor from overspending on 
procurement. For instance, the contract only 
specified a 60x60 tile, yet did not mention whether it 
is made domestically or imported from abroad. This 
control attempts to ensure that the contractor does 
not purchase an imported tile because of the higher 
cost. 
 
Milestone report 
The role of milestone report describes progress of 
construction project. A client can check at any stage 
whether project has fallen under or exceeded 
budgetary costs. If exceeding budgetary costs, the 
client can make an adjustment if costs are over 
budget. 
 
Informal control mechanisms 
Web camera 
The contractor voluntarily installed a web camera on 
the construction project site. The web camera was 
intended to allow both the client and contractor 
management to monitor the construction process and 
site cleanness. A contractor offers this service to a 
client to show they are trustworthy and honest. 
 
Daily report 
The daily report recorded the project information, 
such as weather conditions, number of employees, 
subcontractors by name, numbers of hours worked, 
performance status, defects, and any delays. This 
report allows client to know detail information 
regarding events occur each day. 
 
Selection of subcontractors 
The client and contractor are involved with the 
procurement of a subcontractor. Contracting parties 
individually recommend qualified subcontractors. 
The client and contractor then negotiate the price 
with the supplier.  Finally, the client decides which 
subcontractor to use. 
 
Trust 
Inter-organizational relationships cannot rely on a 
contract or control modes. A business partnership 
requires some form of trust for collaboration. As 
information asymmetries are pervasive in 
construction projects, sharing project information is 
vital to nurturing trust.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This study elucidated the role of control mechanisms 
in a construction project through qualitative analysis. 
A set of controls was identified and catalogued from 
a cost-plus percentage contract. Analysis results 
confirm that a set of control mechanisms is 
necessary as found in previous studies, since no 
business relationships are formed solely on trust (c.f. 
Badenfelt, 2010; Tuuli et al., 2010). A set of control 
mechanisms is vital because the contract does not 
specify formal control implicitly. However, formal 
control is inadequate to manage a construction 
project properly, explaining why informal control is 
complementary formal control. Effectively 
controlling a construction project requires that a 
client must learn how to balance between formal and 
informal control.  
 
Empirical analysis results indicate that   a 
very important item to control in cost-plus 
percentage contract is the overall cost of a project. 
Many mechanisms are used to ensure that 
contractors behave professionally in an agency 
theory, such as a milestone report.  Moreover, 
subcontractors are selected to minimize the risk of 
exceeding budgetary costs.  
 
This study significantly contributes to 
efforts to resolve agency theory related problems. 
The control mechanisms identified had its 
motivation and action. Despite its contributions, this 
study has certain limitations. Owing to that only a 
single case study was examined in this study, the 
lack of a sufficient number of case studies makes it 
impossible to verify data accuracy, thus warranting 
further study on similar contracts in the future.  
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